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With almost half of the world’s poor, and a
combination of weak government and divided
societies, fragile states contribute
disproportionately to the world’s instability and
violence.
This forum seeks to understand them and
address their core challenges. It is edited by Seth
Kaplan and welcomes guest writers.
By Naazneen H. Barma, Elisabeth Huybens, and Lorena Viñuela
Building and operating successful public institutions is a perennial and long-term challenge for
governments, even under ideal circumstances. The complexity of this challenge is compounded by
the volatile conditions found in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCS), where human security,
social cohesion, political stability, and economic activity have been dislocated. Our conventional
understanding of FCS is replete with regrettable instances of institution-building challenges,
obstacles, and—ultimately—failures. Yet, despite the daunting odds, some public institutions in FCS
do manage to take root and effectively deliver results and core services, earn legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, and forge resilience in an otherwise tumultuous operational context.
This observation is the analytical puzzle motivating our recently published World Bank study,
Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts. We examined a sample of
institutional success stories—those public agencies that achieved results, legitimacy, and resilience.
The goal was to illuminate the shared causal factors underlying success and thereby isolate the
institutional practices and processes that underpin capable public institutions in inhospitable settings.
The study covers nine varied public organizations in four countries: The Gambia’s Ministry of Basic
and Secondary Education and Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic’s Ministry of Public Works and Transport and Électricité du Laos; Sierra
Leone’s Local Councils and Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; and Timor Leste’s
Ministry of Health, Central Bank, and Ministry of Social Solidarity.
What we learned about institutional reform from these agencies fills a critical gap in the literature on
FCS and provides guidance for policymakers engaged in public sector institution-building efforts in
countries with weak institutional capacity. Institutions succeed in FCS when they are able to combine
macro-political and micro-institutional strategies geared towards delivering results, legitimacy, and
resilience. They must intertwine skillful navigation of the broader sociopolitical environment in which
they are embedded with deft micro-organizational management through a repertoire of particular
tools and reforms. One especially clear pattern emerged from our study: by focusing on delivering
results and generating legitimacy at the same time, successful organizations develop internal
efficiency and create the external constituencies needed to secure political support. They also
cumulatively build resilience and the ability to sustain gains in what can be rapidly shifting political–
economic environments.
Perhaps most interestingly, the agencies in our study traveled three distinct pathways in connecting
their micro-organizational strategies to the broader macro-sociopolitical environment. Some
institutions succeed on the basis of a positive cycle driven by strong elite commitment to their
particular policy area. Other successful institutions seize on a window of opportunity to lock-in
reforms and build a measure of operational autonomy before the political equilibrium shifts. Still
other agencies succeed by more actively cultivating broad support from clients and key
stakeholders, sometimes in the face of an adverse political environment, working under the radar to
implement reforms and achieve results, ultimately mobilizing some support from political principals.
The distinction between these three pathways to institutional success is in the degree to which
institutional success emanates from political incentives and imperatives or the institution’s own ability
for building a case for its political significance.
No matter which pathway the agency traveled, however, we found that all of them deployed a
repertoire of organizational tools to achieve results, legitimacy, and resilience that is remarkably
similar across the sample. This repertoire includes making strategic choices; adapting administrative
architecture and process to mission; managing people; building organizational identity; leadership
beyond individuals; fostering learning and self-evaluation; and cultivating relationships with clients
and other stakeholders. Many of these elements have long been noted as contributors to
organizational success in developing countries, representing the conventional wisdom in
organizational management theory more generally. Such conclusions have not been given sufficient
weight in operational approaches to supporting FCS.
One of the explicit goals of our study was to understand the shared causal factors underlying
successful institution-building in FCS in order to provide the basis for targeted operational insights
for policies and programs concerning institutional reform. Some high-level operational lessons are as
follows, with more granular instances of each covered in our case studies.
Designing good fit is best practice. Our research confirms that good-fit institutional strategies are
crucial. Institutional fit must be achieved in two dimensions—micro-organizational strategies must be
chosen and supported on the basis of their ultimate function and they must be implemented in light
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of the macro-sociopolitical context in which public agencies are embedded. Better understanding the
history of institutions and how their make-up of individuals, programs, and policies has evolved is
critical to designing better interventions. Better grasping how institutions forge domestic and external
coalitions for change can also inform more comprehensive external support to aid those efforts.
Normative approaches to best practice only make sense if they fit with the political economy context;
and their implementation must be tailored to the existing capacity of agencies.
Implement a building-block strategy. Public institutions, with the support of their development
partners, should follow a building-block approach to developing their mandate that combines short-
and long-term objective-setting on the basis of clearly defined targets. Agencies should focus on
scoring early, monitorable, and reportable successes that can be used to generate further support,
leverage resources, and build morale and momentum. Where possible, functions should be added in
step with the development of the necessary capacity. Alternatively, institutions can outsource
functions to NGOs or the private sector either temporarily or permanently, while focusing on
providing the policy and regulatory framework, setting standards, monitoring outcomes, evaluating
programs, and identifying course corrections.
Emphasize constant learning and use evidence wisely to implement course corrections.
Institutions build and sustain success with an emphasis on continuous organizational learning and
evidence-based decision-making. Information itself is not enough; the key is what is done with the
information—how it is used to validate successful strategies, scale up experiments and pilots that
have gone well, close down initiatives that have shown lesser results, and continuously correct the
institution’s course. Client surveys and feedback can be used to shape changes to service delivery
goals and processes; and systems to collect basic and real-time data on service provision can be
used to make both incremental and more serious adjustments to reforms.
Give staff and clients a stake in the institution’s success. Often institutions and donors focus too
much on the very top leadership of the agency and too little on building and encouraging leadership
qualities within the broader management. Middle and senior managers can stymie otherwise well-
designed reforms or they can be essential in both determining and successfully implementing an
agency’s mandate. Enabling some measure of autonomy in financial and human resource
management is important, along with greater managerial flexibility to give them a stake in success.
For technical staff and frontline service providers, a similar pride and stake in the organization can
be cultivated through tangible performance incentives and more intangible corporate culture and
practices. Moreover, clients can be a potent source of political leverage for an institution and yet they
are often an overlooked stakeholder. Client participation and feedback is important for optimizing
services. In addition, more closely communicating with clients and engaging them in participatory
decision-making gives them an actual stake in the institution’s success and thereby builds a
constituency for sustained change.
Revisit “country ownership”. It is axiomatic that donor support contributes to results when agency
counterparts are firmly in the driver’s seat—yet donors must be nuanced in how they interpret
“country ownership”. The political landscape rarely produces unequivocal support for reforms and
agencies sometimes face considerable hostility and interference from political elites. In this context,
donors can help to shape the immediate operating environment of an agency by helping it to connect
to a broader set of stakeholders both internally and abroad; and, in so doing, can help the institution
buffer itself to some degree against unwanted political interference.
Support networks of leaders. Our case studies highlight the importance of the networks of leaders
that ignite and sustain institutional success, usually heads of agencies and a cadre of managers and
technical staff around them, sometimes reaching into the private and non-government sector. Donor
can support these local networks by expanding their ability to connect across borders and learn from
each other; and they can reward effective leadership by offering avenues for international
recognition.
Be in it for the long haul. The one certain good that donors can provide to their counterparts is a
greater degree of stability and continuity in programming and staffing, along with more hands-on and
continued engagement from the donor side. Institution-building is a dynamic, non-linear process that
moves in fits and starts and is often reversible. To embrace the reality of institutional change,
development partners must be prepared to flexibly to add momentum to salutary change and help
protect agencies against adverse change. Nimble, opportunistic pursuit of reform moments and
champions has its place—but must be accompanied by sustained, incremental partnerships for long-
term success and lasting change.
There is no such thing as a blank slate. Above all, micro-institutional strategies must be
consonant with the macro-sociopolitical context if organizations are to succeed. To state that donors





must understand the political economy of reforms has become a truism; but the development
community is still a long way from putting that wisdom in practice. One concrete way of thinking
about this is that the three pathways to success our study articulates also suggest different
opportunities and entry points for donors to act upon in addition to the elements of support that will
make sense no matter what. The sine qua non of good program design is a deep and nuanced
understanding of the socio-political context in which institutions are embedded combined with an
accurate assessment of organizational capacity, appreciating at least a measure of the historical
trajectory shaping both.
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